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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
the deed of "one dollar and other valuable consideration" is not suffi-
cient to put him in this position.7 Thus the prior grantee by estab-
lishing that the junior grantee is not protected by the Recording Act,
compels the subsequent grantee to produce further evidence of con-
sideration to bring himself within the meaning of "a purchaser for
a valuable consideration" under the statute.
Likewise, the burden ofproducing evidence is upon the. holder
of the unrecorded deed, when the subsequent deed, first recorded,
acknowledges receipt of consideration sufficient to satisfy the Record-
ing Act." In this instance, as in the preceding one, the prior grantee
must show, if he asserts it, that the subsequent grantee took with
notice. Although the subsequent grantee meets the requirements of
the Recording Act, if the prior purchaser shows that a fraud has been
perpetrated upon him by the grantor, the burden of producing evi-
dence then shifts to the subsequent purchaser who must prove that
he had no knowledge of the fraud and that he purchased for a valu-
able consideration. 9 In this instance (where a fraud has been perpe-
trated by the grantor), the proof of a substantial payment by the sub-
sequent grantee, is held to be more than evidence of a valuable
consideration-it is construed as an inference of a purchase without
notice. 10 The burden of adducing evidence to offset this inference
then shifts to the prior purchaser.
E. O. C.
ToRTs-NuIANcE-LIABILITY OF LESSOR AND SUB-LESSEE FOR
WRONGFUL ACT OF INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR.-Defendant Gotham
Silk Hosiery Co. was lessee of an entire building at 34th Street and
Broadway, New York City. Five large signboards were affixed to
the sides and on the roof of the building. Two of these signs were
leased to defendant Strauss & Co., which was engaged in the sign
advertising business. Plaintiff was seriously injured when one end
of a scaffold, which was insecurely suspended from said building, gave
vance is not, within the meaning of the Recording Act, a purchaser for valu-
able consideration and his deed, although recorded, conveys no title as against
a prior unrecorded conveyance of the same property. The consideration must
not only be good, but valuable, in the sense that a fair equivalent is given for
the property granted, in order to constitute the grantee a purchaser for value.).
Lehrenkrauss v. Bonnell, 199 N. Y. 240, 92 N. E. 637 (1910).
'Wood v. Chopin, 13 N. Y. 509 (1856); Page v. Waring, 76 N. Y. 63
(1882).
'Brody v. Pecoraro, 250 N. Y. 56, 164 N. E. 741 (1928) (Where the
proof shows a fraud has been perpetrated, by the grantor, the burden of evi-
dence is shifted upon one who claims to be an innocent purchaser to show that
he acquired the property without any knowledge or notice that would put him
upon inquiry and for a full and adeauate consideration.).
"Brown v. Volkening, 64 N. Y. 76 (1876); Constant v. University of
Rochester, 111 N. Y. 604, 19 N. E. 631 (1889).
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way, and a painter at work on the scaffold fell, and his body struck
the plaintiff. No barricades or danger signals were posted to warn
pedestrians of the scaffold suspended overhead. The painter was
employed by defendant Weil, who had a contract with Strauss & Co.
for painting advertisements on some of these signboards. At Trial
Term the jury found for the plaintiff as against defendant Weil, and
he has not appealed. The complaint was dismissed as against Strauss
& Co. and The Gotham Co'., but this judgment was reversed, and a
new trial ordered by the Appellate Division. On appeal to the Court
of Appeals, held, affirmed, and judgment absolute for plaintiff as
against both appellants. The erection of a scaffold over a public
highway is a nuisance in fact, and appellants who suffered such erec-
tion are liable as joint tort feasors. Rohlfs v. L. Weil, Strauss &
Co., and The Gothamn Silk Hosiery Co., Inc., 271 N. Y. 444, 3
N. E. (2d) 588 (1936).
As a general rule an independent contractor is solely liable for
injuries caused by his negligence, or that of his employees.1 The
owner may be held liable, however, when the thing contracted to be
done is unlawful, or creates a nuisance. 2 If the work is inherently
dangerous, and the injury occurs from an act of the contractor, doing
the work entirely within the limits of his contract, then the employer
is liable, and his duty to guard against injury cannot be delegated; 3
but if the injury is the result of an act of the contractor outside of,
or in violation of his contract, then the employer is freed of liability.4
When the work to be done jeopardizes the safety of the public,5 in
the use of a public place, such as excavating in the street,6 or cleaning
windows of a building abutting on the highway,7 or negligently leaving
the highway in disrepair,8 or blasting on land adjoining a highvay,9
then the courts will invoke the doctrine of respondeat superior,10 and
1 RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) § 384; Deyo v. Kingston Cons. R. R., 94
App. Div. 578, 88 N. Y. Supp. 487 (3d Dept. 1904) ; Heidenway v. Philadelphia,
168 Pa. St. 72, 31 Ati. 1063 (1895).2 RSTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) § 416; Storrs v. City of Utica, 17 N. Y.
104 (1858); Deming v. Terminal R. R., 169 N. Y. 1, 61 N. E. 983 (1901);
Boylhart v. Di Marco & Reimann, 270 N. Y. 217, 200 N. E. 793 (1936). In
the case of Water Co. v. Ware, 16 Wall. 566 (U. S. 1872), Clifford, J., says:
"When a person is engaged in a work, in the ordinary doing of which a nuisance
occurs, the person is liable for any injuries that may result to third persons from
carelessness or negligence, though the work be done by a contractor."
'2 COOLEY, TORTS (3d ed. 1906) 1090; Blake v. Ferris, 5 N. Y. 48 (1851);
Brusso v. City of Buffalo, 90 N. Y. 679 (1882); Deming v. Terminal M. R.,
169 N. Y. 1, 61 N. E. 983 (1901).
'CooLEY, TORTS (3d ed. 1906) 1091; Pack v. Mayor, etc., of N. Y.,
8 N. Y. 222 (1853); Kelly v. Mayor, etc., of N. Y., 11 N. Y. 432 (1854);
McCafferty v. Spuyten Duyvil & P. M. R. R., 61 N. Y. 178 (1874).
Pettingill v. City of Yonkers, 116 N. Y. 558, 22 N. E. 1095 (1889).
'Boylhart v. Di Marco & Reimann, 270 N. Y.,217, 200 N. E. 793 (1936):
7 Doll & Sons v. Ribetti, 203 Fed. 593 (C. C. A. 3d, 1913).
'Trustees, etc. v. Foster, 156 N. Y. 354, 50 N. E. 971 (1898).0 Berg v. Parsons, 156 N. Y. 109, 50 N. E. 957 (1898).
1
oIn Blake v. Ferris, 5 N. Y. 48 (1851), the court gives an exhaustive
discussion of the doctrine of respondeat superior, which is generally accepted to
1936 ]
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forbid the delegation of the employer's duty to protect the public
from the dangers inherent in such work," Hence, in the instant
case, Strauss & Co. breached its non-delegable duty of affording
protection to the public by failing to provide the proper barriers or
danger signals while the work was in progress.' 2
As to the appellant Gotham Co., its liability is predicated upon
entirely different grounds.' 3 As lessee of the entire premises, this
appellant stands in the position of an owner in possession. 4 The
landlord is ordinarily liable for injuries to strangers resulting from a
condition on the premises at the time of the demise,15 or of a particu-
lar use made thereof by the tenant, if this use can be regarded as
having been intended or contemplated by the lessor.16 In leasing
the signboards to Strauss & Co., the appellant clearly intended that
they be used for advertising purposes.' 7 The erection of the scaffold
was an essential incident to such use, and a jury could reasonably
infer that the Gotham Co. gave its permission and consent to the
erection of this dangerous obstruction to street travel.' 8 The mere
fact that the premises are susceptible of a use which may cause injury
to others is not sufficient to place liability on the lessor, because such
use is not necessarily contemplated or intended by him.' 9 But if the
premises are used as they apparently had been intended for use, and
the injury occurs, then the landlord is liable for granting his implied
permission for such use without guarding against the injury with
special precautions.
20
The courts in this state,21 and in other jurisdictions,22 have made
extremely narrow distinctions in deciding cases involving this prin-
this day, although the decision in this case is open to criticism. See Deming v.
Terminal R. R., 169 N. Y. 1, 61 N. E. 983 (1901).
SHexamer v. Webb, 101 N. Y. 377, 4 N. E. 755 (1886); Babbage v.
Powers, 130 N. Y. 281, 29 N. E. 132 (1891).
"Instant case, at p. 448; Jager v. Adams, 123 Mass. 26; Pettingill v.
City, 116 N. Y. 558, 22 N. E. 1095 (1889).
11 TIFFANY, LANDLORD AND TENANT (1910) § 102; Kalis v. Shattuck, 69
Cal. 593, 11 Pac. 346 (1886). But cf. Swords v. Edgar, 69 N. Y. 28 (1874).
2 WALSH, LAW OF PROPERTY (2d ed. 1934) § 177.
1 1 TIFFANY, LANDLORD AND TENANT (1910) § 101; Tomle v. Hampton,
129 IIl. 379, 21 N. E. 800 (1889); Dalay v. Savage, 145 Mass. 38, 12 N. E.
841 (1887).
"Jennings v. Van Schaick, 101 N. Y. 530, 15 N. E. 424 (1888); Ahern v.
Steele, 115 N. Y. 203, 22 N. E. 193 (1889).
17 Instant case at p. 449.
" Melker v. City of N. Y., 190 N. Y. 481, 83 N. E. 565 (1908) ; Doll &
Sons v. Ribetti, 203 Fed. 593 (C. C. A. 3d, 1913).
1 TIFFANY, LANDLORD AND TENANT (1910) § 101, p. 676; Gould v.
Stafford, 91 Cal. 146, 27 Pac. 543 (1891).
'Jackman v. Arlington Mills, 137 Mass. 277.
'Mehler v. Fisch, 65 Misc. 549, 120 N. Y. Supp. 807 (1910) ; Doll & Sons
v. Ribetti, 203 Fed. 593 (C. C. A. 3d, 1913); Zolezzi v. Bruce-Brown, 243
N. Y. 490, 154 N. E. 535 (1926).
'Weilbacher v. Putts, 123 Md. 249, 91 Atl. 343 (1914); cf. Davis v.
Whiting & Son Co., 201 Mass. 91, 87 N. E. 199 (1909); McHarge v. New-
comer, 117 Tenn. 595, 100 S. W. 700 (1907).
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ciple of liability.23 A review of the most recent decisions handed
down shows such a diversity of opinion that its future path is a
matter of mere conjecture.2 4
E. F. A.
WILLS-DECEDENT ESTATE LAw-ADOPTION.-Testatrix left a
will devising and bequeathing all her property, both real and per-
sonal, to her brother. The brother predeceased her leaving surviving
the plaintiff, his adopted daughter, and no other children or descen-
dants. The defendant administrator contends that the gift lapsed as
Section 29 of the Decedent Estate Law,1 which provides that if a
legatee or devisee who is a brother, sister, child or descendant of the
testator predeceases said testator, the property will vest in a surviving
descendant, is limited to blood relatives. Held, for the plaintiff. The
gift to the brother did not lapse but passed to the adopted daughter
pursuant to Section 29 of the Decedent Estate Law, as the words
"child" and "descendant" in the statute are not limited in meaning
to blood relatives. Matter of Walter, 270 N. Y. 201, 200 N. E. 786
(1936).
A child when adopted is the same as a natural child for the pur-
poses of inheritance from its foster parents,2 except that, as to the
limitation over of property in trust dependent on the foster parent
dying without heirs, such child shall not be deemed to sustain such a
relation to its foster parent as to defeat rights of remaindermen.3 Simi-
larly, the foster parents inherit from an adopted child, as though the
child was born to them in lawful wedlock.4 The adopted child, how-
'Instant case, dissenting opinion of Lehman, J., at p. 451; cf. Kirby v.
Newman, 239 N. Y. 470, 147 N. E. 69 (1925).
Leonard v. City of Hornellsville, 166 N. Y. 590, 59 N. E. 1125 (1899);
Schneyer v. Leblang Realty Corp., et at., etc., N. Y. L. J., Sept. 28, 1936.
'N. Y. DECEDENT ESTATE LAW § 29, reads as follows: "Whenever any
estate, real or personal, shall be devised or bequeathed to a child or other
descendant of the testator, or to a brother or sister of the testator, and such
legatee or devisee shall die during the lifetime of the testator, leaving a
child or other descendant who shall survive such testator, such devise or
legacy shall not lapse, but the property so devised or bequeathed shall vest
in the surviving child or other descendant of the legatee or devisee, as if
such legatee or devisee had survived the testator and had died intestate."
'Matter of Cook, 187 N. Y. 253, 79 N. E. 991 (1907); Carpenter v.
Buffalo Gen. Elec. Co., 213 N. Y. 101, 106 N. E. 1026 (1914); Matter of
Horn, 256 N. Y. 294, 176 N. E. 399 (1931); Dodin v. Dodin, 16 App. Div. 42,
44 N. Y. Supp. 800 (2d Dept. 1897), aff'd, 162 N. Y. 635, 57 N. E. 1108
(1900).
'N. Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 114; Matter of Horn, 256 N. Y. 294, 176
N. E. 399 (1931); Dodin v. Dodin, 16 App. Div. 42, 44 N. Y. Supp. 800
(2d Dept. 1897), aff'd, 162 N. Y. 635, 57 N. E. 1108 (1900) ; Von Beck v.
Thomsen, 44 App. Div. 373, 60 N. Y. Supp. 1094 (1st Dept. 1899).
'Gilliam v. Guaranty Trust Co., 186 N. Y. 127, 78 N. E. 697 (1906);
Matter of Cook, 187 N. Y. 253, 79 N. E. 991 (1907); Carpenter v. Buffalo
1936 ]
